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Daniels and von der Ruhr 1 
The Determinants of Immigration-Policy Preferences in Advanced 
Economies: A Cross-Country Study 
By Joseph P. Daniels and Marc von der Ruhr* 
 
This paper employs survey data to examine the determinants of immigration-policy 
preferences among ten advanced economies. Ordered probit specifications suggest that 
skill level is a robust determinant of immigration-policy preferences and that less-skilled 
workers are more likely to express a preference for policies that restrict immigration. The 
results also suggest that older individuals, members of trade unions, and those who classify 
their political ideology as conservative are more likely to favor limiting immigration while 
non-citizens are less likely to favor such policies. Individual country-level regression results 
vary, in particular with regard to the influence of trade union member- ship, which is a 
robust determinant of immigration-policy preferences for both measures of skill in only a 
subset of nations. (JEL FO, F2, HO) 
 
Introduction 
The process of globalization continues to be the subject of considerable debate. 
Controversy surrounds many aspects of globalization, including the impact that increasing trade 
and capital flows have on economies, the role and influence international institutions should have 
on national policies, and the effect of immigration policies on destination economies. Recently, 
particularly in Europe, policies governing legal immigration are at the center of political debate. 
Public views toward immigration policy are the focus of this paper. 
It is a widely held belief that increased immigration decreases workers incomes in the 
destination country and increases unemployment among native workers [Friedberg and Hunt, 
1995]. Though each concern represents a relevant economic question, popular beliefs and 
economic theory seem at odds with each other. In fact, most economic studies find small net 
gains in GDP per capita to host countries from increased immigration and that past immigration 
has had no obvious impact on unemployment in the host country. (For evidence and a summary 
of the literature, see Coppel, et al. [2001]). 
This tension between the public opinion of the perceived effects of immigration on a host 
economy and the actual economic impact creates an interesting policy problem. On the one 
hand, special interest groups and non-governmental organizations are becoming more globally 
organized, thereby increasing their capabilities of influencing economic policy in several 
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countries simultaneously [OECD, 1996]. This influence is, at least in part, based on popular 
public opinion. On the other hand, as suggested above, a significant portion of public opinion is 
inconsistent with actual economic outcomes. Consequently, there is the possibility that policies 
increasingly are affected by misguided opinion rather than data or theory. As a result, it is a 
valuable exercise to study the determinants of individual level immigration-policy preferences so 
economists can better understand possible sources of misinformation among the general public. 
There are a number of excellent studies in the economics literature on the effects of 
immigration on host economies, and of immigration. Yet, as Scheve and Slaughter [2001] point 
out, little research has focused on the determinants of individual preferences regarding 
immigration policy. They argue that only after individual preferences are understood can 
reasonable policy-making efforts be made. 
This paper extends Scheve and Slaughter's analysis of the U.S. to present new evidence 
on immigration-policy preferences across ten advanced economies. The data is unique in that it 
results from a single survey instrument employed during a given year across a number of 
economies. This study, therefore, contributes to the literature in a two important ways. First, it 
tests whether skill level--as measured by education and relative income is a robust determinant 
of immigration-policy preferences across a large sample of advanced economies. Second, it 
considers not only aggregated results across ten countries, but also examines results for reach 
individual country included in the sample. 
The empirical examination shows that skill level is a robust determinant of immigration- 
policy preferences, that is, less skilled workers are more likely to want limits on immigration. The 
results also suggest that individuals are more likely to favor policies limiting immigration as they: 
(1) are older, (2) are members of trade unions, and (3) classify their political ideology as 
conservative. The results also indicate that individuals who are not citizens of their country, or 
whose parents are not citizens of the respondent's country are less likely to favor policies that 
restrict immigration. Individual country-level regression results do vary, in particular with regard 
to the influence of trade union membership. This last result suggests a need for further research 
on how political opinions and activities of trade unions vary across countries. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two reviews pertinent 
literature that gauges general public opinion and explains the political economy of trade-policy 
preferences. Section three presents the key results of a cross-national survey, thereby de- 
scribing the dependent variable of the authors' analysis. Section four describes the empirical 
treatment of the data and provides the results of the analysis and their interpretation. Section five 
offers a summary and suggestions for future research.  
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The Political Economy of Immigration-Policy Preferences  
The majority of research on the determinants of immigration pohcy in host countries has 
focused on immigration politics. This is not surprising, as migration politics historically developed 
along with economic development because these policies are used to influence the size and 
composition of the labor force. 
Historically, immigration policy seems to have been influenced by labor market 
conditions in a given country, whereas immigrant flows have been strongly linked to labor 
market differences between countries. Williamson [1998] lists a series of historical events linking 
immigration restrictions to labor market conditions as opposed to actual immigrant flows. It 
initially seems understandable that an economy experiencing higher unemployment or lagging 
wages may restrict immigration. Friedberg and Hunt [1995], however, find that there is not much 
support in the economic literature to the claim that immigrants have an impact on wages and 
employment of residents native to the market absorbing the immigrants. Further, as mentioned 
in the introduction, Coppel, et al. find that most empirical research indicates small net gains in 
GDP per capita to host countries from increased immigration and that past immigration has no 
obvious impact on unemployment in the host country.  
Because this analysis of individual level immigration-policy preferences extends the 
recent work of Scheve and Slaughter on the United States, the reader is referred to their more 
extensive summary of the literature and explanation of the underlying theory. The authors appeal 
to two common international trade theories in order to logically evaluate the likely impact of 
immigration on a host economy: the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model, and the specific- factors 
model. Both theories address the effect of increased immigration on input factors' returns in order 
to explain how individuals evaluate the effect of increased immigration on their income. 
Following the previous work, three implicit assumptions are made in applying these 
models. First, it is assumed that current factor income plays a major role in how people view their 
own economic well-being. Second, it is assumed that native workers in an economy believe that 
legal immigration increases the supply of relatively low-skilled workers; a reasonable assumption 
to characterize the advanced economies that are considered. Finally, it is assumed that labor 
markets are flexible enough to allow for full employment. The role of factor payments and income 
can thus be specifically addressed without concern for unemployment. Given these assumptions, 
much of an advanced economy resident's attitude towards immigration can be credibly attributed 
to how an influx of labor will influence that resident's income via their factor payment. 
The first theoretical framework applied is the H-O model, which allows for interregional 
and intersectoral labor mobility. Consequently, the model has no geographically segmented 
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labor markets within a country. The effect of immigration on wages depends on both the 
magnitude of immigration and the influence the host economy has on world prices. Assuming a 
relatively small inflow of immigrants and a relatively small economy, wages are not affected 
because the effect of immigrants is absorbed via changes in the mix of output produced. The 
change in the mix of skilled and unskilled laborers merely motivates firms to produce more of the 
good that uses that type of labor more intensively. With world trade, the output change is shared 
with the rest of the world. If the country is not large enough to alter world prices, then wages do 
not change.  
Wages do change, however, when the country welcoming the immigrants is large enough 
to change world output product prices. When world output prices change, the Stolper- 
Samuelson theorem states that wages will change, as well. A relative increase in the price of an 
output will increase the real return to the factor used relatively intensively in the production of that 
output industry and reduce the real return to the other factor. Thus, the link between 
immigration-policy preferences and skill depends upon whether an individual believes that the 
inflow of immigrants will change wages. If an individual sees no such relationship, there should 
be no link between skill level and immigration preferences. Conversely, if the individual does 
expect a relationship, there will be a link.  
A similar approach is taken by the second theoretical model that is applied; the specific- 
factors model. In contrast to the H-O model, the specific-factors model assumes that in each 
sector, there exists one input that cannot migrate between sectors, thereby making it "specific" to 
a given sector. There is, however, another input that is freely mobile between sectors. If this 
model is applied to the issue of immigration, it may be assumed that skilled labor is the fixed 
input and unskilled labor is the mobile input. The model predicts that as the endowment of the 
mobile factor (unskilled labor) increases, its own real income will fall while the real income of the 
specific factor (skilled labor) will rise.1 
Based on these theories, the leading channel by which immigration affects individuals is 
through its perceived impact on individuals' labor-market returns. Past work that studied 
immigration policies includes Goldin [1994], who finds that the U.S. House of Representatives, in 
1915, was more likely to vote for immigration literacy tests (thereby lowering immigration) the 
lower the wage increases in various districts between 1907 and 1915. Timmer and Williamson 
[1998] similarly consider political actions to infer facts regarding immigration preferences. They 
study five countries between 1860 and 1930 and find that more restrictive immigration policies to 
be correlated with a lower level of unskilled wages relative to average per-capita income. Not all 
studies find similar results. Citrin et al. [1997] find that personal economic circumstances play a 
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small role in the formation of personal opinions. Espenshade and Hempstead [1996] find mixed 
evidence relating skill level and immigration restrictions. Scheve and Slaughter [2001] find that 
less-skilled workers are significantly more likely to prefer limiting immigrant inflows to the U.S. 
They find no evidence, however, that the relationship between skill and immigration policy 
preferences is stronger in high-immigration, or gateway, communities. This paper contributes to 
the literature by studying individuals' preferences of immigration-policies across ten advanced 
economies in an effort to directly measure the impact of various demographic variables on 
immigration-policy preferences from a global perspective. Further, it tests the robustness of skill 
level as a determinant of immigration-policy preferences by employing two different measures of 
skill: education and relative income. Finally, this paper considers the differences in 
immigration-policy preferences across each individual country to compare the results with the 
aggregated regression results. 
 
Description of Data on Immigration-Policy Preferences in the Advanced 
Economies 
The data employed in this study are the results of a survey conducted and compiled by 
Zentralarchiv ftir Empirische Sozialforschung. The survey, which embodies the most current 
international survey data available on a broad range of global issues, is part of the Inter- 
national Social Survey Program (ISSP) and is titled ISSP: National Identity 1996. 2 This survey 
focuses on respondents' attitudes toward issues of national identity and international relations, 
and includes many demographic variables on the respondents.  
Description of the Dependent Variable 
Table I provides the survey item on immigration-policy preferences and summarizes the 
responses. The question asks for the respondent to reveal the direction of their preferences for 
immigration policies, yet it does not indicate what labor markets would be affected. Using this 
question implicitly assumes that the respondent has some understanding of the effects of 
immigration policy changes on their individual welfare. 
Typical of research employing survey data, missing data can be problematic and the 
treatment of missing data is covered in the next section of this paper. It is important to note here, 
however, that the overall response rate to the policy-oriented immigration question exceeds 91 
percent. The response rate ranges from 83 percent for Japan to over 96 percent for Australia.  
Figure 1 provides the number of respondents answering either, 'reduced a little" or "reduced a 
lot" as a percent of those responding (missing values are excluded from this chart). The figure 
shows that the percentage agreeing that policymakers should limit immigration ranges from more 
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than 76 percent in Germany to just over 21 percent in the Ireland. The average across all of the 
nations in the sample is 59 percent. Hence, in this sample, there is an absolute majority in favor 
of restricting the number of immigrants in the respondent's country. Nonetheless, there is a great 
deal of variation across countries and this variation should be accounted for in an empirical 
study. 
Summary and Description of the Independent Variables 
This study is specifically designed to test the robustness of skill level as a determinant of 
immigration-policy preferences in the advanced economies. The authors allow for two differ- ent 
specifications in order to employ two possible measures of skill. Similar to the previously cited 
studies, one measure of skill they include is education. A second measure employed is the 
respondent's income relative to the national average in the respondent's country in a second 
model. 3 An additional test of the robustness of skill level is to include other indi- vidual 
characteristics related studies show to be statistically significant determinants. Age, gender, 
citizenship, trade union membership, and political ideology are, therefore, included as 
explanatory variables. (Italy, New Zealand, and Japan are excluded from the remainder of this 
study because the item on income was not completed in the survey.) Table 2 provides summary 
statistics of the independent variables. 
Educations and age are measured in numbers of years; earnings is the respondent's 
income as a percentage of the mean value for the respondent's nation of residence; gender 
equals 1 for males and 0 for females; citizenship equals 1 if the respondent is not a citizen, 2 if a 
parent is not a citizen, 3 if neither parents are citizens, and 4 if neither the respondent or a parent 
are citizens, and 0 otherwise; political ideology ranges from 1 for far left to 5 for far right; trade 
union membership equals 1 if the respondent is a member of a trade union and 0 otherwise. 
Gender is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of unity for male and zero for 
female. Age is a continuous variable. Citizenship examines whether the respondent and or a 
combination of their parent(s) is (are) citizens of the respondent's country. The variable ranges 
from one, indicating that the respondent and both parents are citizens, to four, indicating that 
neither the respondent nor one of the parents is a citizen. Previous studies are unclear as to the 
effect of gender on attitudes toward immigration. Based on trade policy studies, older 
respondents are expected to favor policies that restrict immigration. In addition, non-citizens are 
expected to oppose policies that restrict immigration. Political Ideology is a categorical variable 
that ranges from one, indicating someone who places themself at the far left, to five, indicating 
someone who places themself at the far right. Previous studies conclude that more conservative 
respondents are more likely to support immigration restrictions. Following studies of U.S. 
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residents, Trade Union Membership is included as an explanatory variable. It is a dichotomous 
variable equal to unity if the respondent is now, or once was, a member of a trade union and zero 
otherwise. Previous studies conclude that trade union members are more likely to favor 
protectionist policies. Given the documented role of trade union membership in affecting trade 
restrictions in the above studies, it is expected that trade union members are more likely to favor 
restrictions on immigration. 
The remaining variables measure the individual respondent's skill level. Education is a 
continuous variable measured in years. Education is expected to correlate negatively with the 
dependent variable. That is, respondents with higher levels of education are more likely to 
disagree with policy actions that restrict immigration. 
Earnings is a continuous measure of the respondent's annual income in terms of the 
domestic currency. To create a variable suitable for cross-country comparison, the mean value 
of income is calculated in each individual nation. The individual respondent's income is then 
expressed as a percentage of the mean pertaining to their nation of residence.4It is expected, 
therefore, that a relatively lower-income will correlate with preferences to restrict immigration. 
Finally, to capture individual country differences, a dummy variable is included for each country.5 
 
Econometric Approach and Results 
In the empirical analysis, the immigration-policy question is modeled as an ordered 
choice model with five possible answers as detailed in Table 1. Given that the multiple categories 
of responses to the survey question follow a natural order, ordered probit (OP) estimation 
techniques are employed, which also allows the authors to readily compare many of their results 
to previous literature. 
Missing Values 
The first difficulty lies in addressing the problem of missing values, a common problem in 
empirical treatments of survey data. (Missing values for the data used here can be found in 
Tables 1 and 2.) There are basically two approaches to handling missingness. The first approach 
is to omit the cases with missing values via listwise deletion. Listwise deletion, however, may 
result in biased estimates if the deleted cases systematically differ from the observed cases. 
Listwise deletion also reduces the efficiency of estimates because important information is lost. 
The most common alternative to listwise deletion is to impute values for missing data. 
Multiple imputation does not assume that the missing data is missing at random as does listwise 
deletion. Rather it generates correct uncertainty estimates conditional on the data used to impute 
missing values. To generate data sets with imputed values for missing data, the authors use the 
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EMis algorithm of Amelia: A Program for Missing Data, by Honaker et al. [2000]. The reader is 
referred to King et al. [2001] for a detailed description of the advantages of this approach and the 
EMis algorithm. 
The process of imputing values involves three steps. The first step is to generate multiple 
data sets containing imputed values for missing data. Based on the size of the data set and 
following King et al., five data sets are generated for all applications in this study. The imputed 
values are generated using all of the observed data employed in the regression analysis as 
described above. The second step is to estimate a regression model for all of the imputed data 
sets, thereby creating multiple coefficient estimates. The final step is to combine the estimated 
coefficients and standard errors. Although the literature indicates a preference for regression 
analysis based on imputed values, estimates based on listwise deletion were also generated and 
are available upon request. 
OP Estimates 
The five imputed data sets were used to generate the OP estimates for two aggregate 
models and two sets of individual country estimates. The estimated parameters of the five 
imputed data sets were combined together and are provided below. Model coefficients are the 
mean estimates of the five imputed data sets. The standard errors are found by averaging the 
mean standard error across the five data sets and combining this value with the standard error 
across the five data sets, which is adjusted for the fact that the number of observations is less 
than infinity. 
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and 	 is the number of imputed data sets.  
Two different aggregate models are estimated. The first, the baseline model, contains the 
demographic variables (age, gender, political ideology, trade union membership, and citizen- 
ship), and one measure of skill: income. To capture country specific effects on immigration- 
policy preferences, a country dummy variable is included in each model for each of the ten 
countries. (The dummy variables are jointly significant across all both models.) The second 
model replaces income with education as a measure of skill. The dependent variable in each 
model is the response to the immigration-policy question described in Table 1.  
Daniels and von der Ruhr 9 
Table 3 provides the parameter estimates for the aggregate models. The coefficients that 
are statistically significant carry their expected signs over all three specifications. Further, across 
all three models, age, citizenship, political ideology, and the skill level (however measured) are 
always significant at a 1 percent level of significance. Thus, the results imply that older 
individuals and individuals who view themselves as politically conservative are more likely to 
favor policies that restrict immigration. Individuals who are not citizens, or whose parents are not 
citizens of the respondent's country are less likely to favor policies that restrict immigration. 
Further, as skill level increases (measured by education or relative income), respondents are 
less likely to favor policies that restrict immigration. In the individual country regressions, the 
authors focus on the trade union variable. In the aggregate models the coefficient associated 
with trade union membership is positive and significant at a one percent level of significance in 
both models. Thus, trade union members are more likely to indicate a preference for policies that 
restrict immigration. 
To better understand the impact of increases in skill on immigration-policy preferences, 
increases in skill level are simulated to isolate their impact on the probability that an individ- ual 
chooses one of the responses to the survey question detailed in Table 1. The simulation is 
conducted in the following manner using Clarify: Software for Interpreting and Presenting 
Statistical Results, Tomz et al. [2001]. First, 1,000 simulated parameters are drawn from an 
asymptotic sampling distribution that is multivariate normal, and whose mean is equal to the 
vector of parameter estimates and variance equal to the variance-covariance matrix of estimates. 
Next, the simulated parameters are used to calculate two sets of probabilities. First, all the 
explanatory variables are set at their actual value except for the measure of skill level, which is 
set at its median value. From this, the predicted probability of response is generated to each 
category of the immigration-policy question. Then, skill level is increased in value to its 90 th 
percentile (one standard deviation), and a second set of probabilities for each response category 
is calculated. The changes in these two sets of probabilities are graphically illustrated in Figures 
2 and 3. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the fact that increases in skill level are likely to increase the 
probability that a respondent favors policies that increase immigration or leave immigration 
unchanged; and decrease the probability that a respondent favors policies that decrease 
immigration. It is only the degree to which these probabilities change that differs between the skill 
TABLE 3 (CONT)  
Income  Education  
Sweden  0.227148***  0.193794***  
 
(0.0418039)  (0.041531)  
Canada  -0.415431"**  -0.248226"**  
 
(0.0359265)  (0.0369057)  
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measures used. 
Frey [1992, p. 230] argues that because empirical research has been predominately 
focused on the United States, it makes it difficult to determine what part of the results are due to 
public choice views and the part due to "particular conditions obtaining to the United States."  
It is important, therefore, not to generalize across countries the characteristics that influence  
immigration-policy preferences. 
Daniels and von der Ruhr [2002] argue that, in regard to policies that restrict international 
trade of goods, trade union membership as a determinant of individual policy preferences cannot 
be generalized across countries. Their evidence leads the authors to consider whether the 
importance of trade union membership as a determinant of preference toward policies restricting 
immigration may vary over different countries. Furthermore, because the country- specific 
dummies were jointly significant in the previous specifications, there are systematic differences 
across the ten countries. Consequently, the authors are interested in examining these 
specifications on a country-by-country level to explore country-specific influences on 
immigration-policy preferences. To conduct the country-level analysis, they estimate the two 
models for each individual country. Again, estimates are made for each imputed data set and the 
coefficients and standard errors are calculated in the manner described earlier. The results are, 
in most respects, similar to the aggregated results. Because of space considerations, the full 
results are not provided here, but are available upon request. An important and interesting 
difference, however, is the impact of trade union membership. Table 4 provides the estimated 
coefficients and standard errors for trade union membership of each nation in the sample. 
Table 4 shows that trade union membership is significant in the income model for 
Australia, West Germany, Sweden and Canada, at the 5 percent level, and for Austria at the 10 
percent level. In model two (education) it is significant for Australia and Canada at the 5 percent 
level and for Sweden at the 10 percent level. Hence, in the aggregate specifications, trade union 
membership as a determinant of immigration-policy preference is primarily driven by the 
significance of this variable for only a subset of nations.6 
Though the authors do not explore this result in greater detail here, it may have 
implications for the possibility of the coordination of trade union activities across nation borders. 
After all, if trade union members in one nation do not have the same attitudes toward immigration 
as trade union members in another nation, it may prove impossible to achieve international 
solidarity as suggested by authors such as Sebbens [2000]. They leave the issue of trade union 
membership as a determinant of individual preferences toward global economic policies as a 
recommendation for future research. 
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Summary and Conclusion 
A number of empirical studies on the United States show that respondents' revealed 
preferences for immigration-policies that restrict immigration are consistent with the Heckscher- 
Ohlin theorem. That is, respondents with higher skills oppose such policies while those with 
lower skills favor such policies. This paper presented survey data on preferences for immigration 
policies for ten advanced economies. Within the entire sample, it was found that preferences 
toward immigration-policies are split 59 percent in favor of reducing immigration, and 39 percent 
in favor of either increasing immigration or leaving it unchanged. Nonetheless, there is 
considerable variation in the mean response across counties. Using an ordered probit model, the 
authors find that respondents' skill level--as measured by education and income is a robust 
determinant of immigration-policy preferences in a sample of 10 advanced economies. 
Interestingly, while trade union membership is significant in the specifications applied to the 
aggregated data, individual country regressions show that trade union membership is a 
statistically significant, robust determinant of immigration-policy preferences only in a small 
number of countries. 
This study, therefore, makes a number of important contributions to the existing literature. 
Specifically, cross-country data are presented on the general public's immigration-policy 
preferences and illustrate that individual skill-level is a robust determinant of immigration- policy 
preferences. Hence, the general results found for the United States are robust across a large 
sample of developed economies. Part of the gap between public opinion and the actual 
economic impact of immigration, therefore, is due to perceptions (arguably misperceptions) that 
immigration increases unemployment and reduces wages of low-skilled workers in the 
destination country. 
Further, the authors show that conditions particular to the respondent's country of 
residence need to be separated from public-choice results. Specifically they provide results 
indicating that the influence of trade union membership as a determinant of immigration-policy 
preferences is unique to a subset of countries and, therefore, should not be generalized across 
nations. Future research should examine the determinants of immigration-policy preferences 
across time as well as across countries. Additionally the similarities and differences of the 
preferences of trade union members across countries should be further examined to determine 
the underlying reason(s) for differences in immigration-policy preference for trade union 
members in different nations. 
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Footnotes 
*. Marquette University and St. Norbert College—U.S.A. 
1. A last approach that is discussed in the literature, but not well suited to this paper 
(due to limitations introduced by using the international data set we use in this paper) is the 
area analysis model. In this model, there is a single output market, but unlike the preceding 
discussion, the labor market is locally segmented. Thus, the effect on wages depends on the 
segment of the market in which the individual lives along with that person's skill level. The 
relationship between skill level and immigration-policy preferences discussed under the 
factor-proportions-analysis model will hold for individuals located in areas that experience the 
inflow of immigrants. Individuals located in areas that do not absorb the immigrants will not 
illustrate a link between skill level and immigration-policy preferences. 
2. Independent institutions in each country collected the data for the ISSP. Neither 
the original collectors nor the ZENTRALARCHIV bear any responsibility for the analyses or 
interpretation presented here. 
3. Scheve and Slaughter include occupational wage as an alternative measure of 
skill. O'Rourke and Sinnott [2001], however, use the International Standard Classification of 
Occupations (ISCO) as a measure of skill. This classification, however, does not necessarily 
following a logical ordering of skill. Hence, the authors do not include it as an explanatory 
variable here. Results of this model, however, are available upon request. The ISCO can be 
found on the International Labour Organization's Website at 
www.ilo.org/public/EngYzsh/bureau/stat/class/isco.htm. 
4. This particular measure may include income from sources other than wages and 
salaries and, therefore, may not entirely reflect skill level. This, of course, is a caveat to the 
model that uses income as a measure of skill level. 
5. In an alternative approach, we account for cross-country differences by including 
an immigration openness variable, constructed as the number of immigrants relative to the 
labor force in each country during the year of the survey. The results of that specification are 
both qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the results provided here, and are available 
upon request. 
6. As pointed out by one referee, U.S. union member do not oppose immigration, 
with is consistent with the AFL-CIO [February, 2000], whose position on immigration is that 
"The AFL-CIO proudly stands on the side of immigrant workers. Throughout the history of 
this country, immigrants have played an important role in building our nation and its 
democratic institutions. New arrivals from every continent have contributed their energy, 
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talent, and commitment to making the United States richer and stronger. Likewise, the 
American union movement has been enriched by the contribu- tions and courage of 
immigrant workers. Newly arriving workers continue to make indispensable contributions to 
the strength and growth of our unions." 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Summary of Survey Item 
Do you think the number of immigrants to (Respondent’s country) should be… 
Response 1 Increased a lot 
Response 2 Increased a little 
Response 3 Remain the same as it is 
Response 4 Reduced a lot 
Response 5 Reduced a lot 
Mean Response 3.780 
Median Response 4.000 
Standard Deviation 1.030 
Number of Respondents 14,601 
Number of Observations 13,410 
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Table 2: Summary Data on Independent Variables 




Education 14.23 12.00 12.79 14,194 
Earnings 99.98 93.19 67.70 12,076 
Age 45.27 43.00 16.64 14,412 
Gender 1.52 2.00 0.50 14,504 
Citizenship 1.17 1.05 0.58 14,601 
Political 
Ideology 
3.41 3.00 1.61 13,000 
Trade Union 
Membership 
1.68 2.00 0.48 12,198 
Educations and age are measured in numbers of years; earnings is the respondent's income as 
a percentage of the mean value for the respondent's nation of residence; gender equals 1 for 
males and 0 for females; citizenship equals 1 if the respondent is not a citizen, 2 if a parent is not 
a citizen, 3 if neither parents are citizens, and 4 if neither the respondent or a parent are citizens, 
and 0 otherwise; political ideology ranges from 1 for far left to 5 for far right; trade union 
membership equals 1 if the respondent is a member of a trade union and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 3: Ordered Probit Estimates for Models 1 through 2 
 Income Education 
Gender 0.019280 -0.018265 
 (0.0109693) (0.0182837) 
Age 0.005602*** 0.002287*** 
 (0.0006617) (0.0006783) 
Trade Union Membership -0.063587*** -0.058564 
 (0.024467) (0.0236234) 
Political Ideology 0.173584*** 0.171461*** 
 (0.0113607) (0.0108065) 
Income -0.001519***  
 (0.000146)  
Education  -0.065681*** 
  (0.003023) 
Australia -1.708140*** -2.555812*** 
 (0.0653442) (0.076916) 
Germany 0.488583*** 0.432964*** 
 (0.0425602) (0.0440097) 
Great Britain 0.309215*** 0.272826*** 
 (0.0482271) (0.0473741) 
United States 0.110148*** 0.193639*** 
 (0.0426958) (0.0422688) 
Austria 0.021065 -0.082588** 
 (0.0425791) (0.0427078) 
Ireland -0.675490*** -0.675224*** 
 (0.0413599) (0.0416118) 
Netherlands 0.056738* 0.103272*** 
 (0.0353103) (0.0353738) 
Norway 0.094071*** 0.125836*** 
 (0.0373503) (0.0374466) 
Sweden 0.227148*** 0.193794*** 
 (0.0418039) (0.041531) 
Canada -0.415431*** -0.248226*** 
 (0.0359265) (0.0369057) 
Standard errors in parentheses.  ***Significant at 1 percent.  **Significant at 5 percent.  
*Significant at 10 percent. 
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Table 4: Ordered Probit Estimates of the Coefficient of Trade Union Membership 
 Income Education 
Australia 0.08253228** 0.09164566** 
 (0.04642174) (0.04633984) 
West Germany 0.1486334** 0.07692568 
 (0.0683852) (0.06888582) 
Great Britain -0.06126222 -0.07226052 
 (0.08382202) (0.08328108) 
U.S.A. 0.03783532 0.02211384 
 (0.0673445) (0.0669835) 
Austria 0.10532746* 0.07289704 
 (0.07476056) (0.07334856) 
Ireland -0.02032718 -0.05186114 
 (0.08327844) (0.0808714) 
Netherlands 0.01032054 0.05483676 
 (0.05988328) (0.06019534) 
Norway -0.06159008 -0.01948904 
 (0.05900978) (0.05769802) 
Sweden 0.12349572** 0.09181746* 
 (0.071512) (0.07003452) 
Canada 0.13035558** 0.118565** 
 (0.056925) (0.05693166) 
Standard errors in parentheses.  **Significant at 5 percent.  *Significant at 10 percent. 
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Figure 3: Change in Probability of Response to Change in Education 
 
 
 
